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FOREWORD 
Three years ago, the Council on Foreign Relations launched a commission to examine 
U.S. policy in the Andean region and the Colombian conflict. The result, Andes 2020: A 
New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region, outlined a comprehensive 
new regional policy designed to move toward a better balance of “guns versus butter.” 
Unfortunately, violence continues to plague the region to this day, most recently in 
Bolivia, where the controversial actions of President Evo Morales and the organized 
opposition have increased polarization and the likelihood of sustained social unrest.  
This new Council Special Report, sponsored by the Council’s Center for 
Preventive Action, addresses the ongoing social, political, and economic challenges 
underway in Bolivia and presents a clear set of recommendations for the U.S. 
government. Bolivia on the Brink, written by Eduardo A. Gamarra, professor and 
director, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, argues 
that with ethnic, regional, and political tensions in Bolivia on the rise, Washington’s 
current “wait and see” approach to the Morales government is no longer adequate.  
Instead, Gamarra encourages the U.S. government to redirect its policy toward Bolivia 
with an emphasis on preservation of democratic process and conflict prevention.    
In order to do so, the report recommends the use of more carrot than stick in the 
near term, encouraging Washington to continue to work to develop relations with both 
the Bolivian government and opposition. Gamarra argues that excluding Bolivia from 
trade, military training, and development assistance would only push the Morales 
government closer to Cuba and Venezuela, feed anti-American sentiment in the region, 
and increase the likelihood of sociopolitical turmoil. Describing U.S. leverage too limited 
to influence the direction of the Bolivian government, the report also urges Washington 
to work with regional states to persuade all Bolivian parties to work within the 
democratic system to address the nation’s many challenges.  
The result is a valuable contribution to any consideration of U.S. policy in the 
region, one that merits attention from regional specialists and foreign policy generalists 
alike.    
Richard N. Haass 
President 
Council on Foreign Relations 
February 2007 
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 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since gaining independence from Spain in 1825, Bolivia has endured nearly 200 coups 
and countercoups. Despite the establishment of comparatively democratic, civilian rule in 
Bolivia in 1982 through a system of “pacted democracy,” Bolivian leaders still face many 
of the same difficult problems as they did twenty years ago: deep-seated poverty, social 
exclusion of the indigenous and mestizo (of mixed racial ancestry) majority, and illegal 
drug production.  
In December 2005, Bolivians elected Movement Toward Socialism’s (MAS) Evo 
Morales president. Morales, a coca union leader, and the first Aymara Indian to hold the 
presidency, has promised to address Bolivia’s core dilemmas by restoring the authority of 
the state in economic decision-making, challenging the country’s traditional political 
class, and empowering the nation’s poor. The election of Morales, a close ally of 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and vocal critic of U.S.-led trade initiatives, provided 
further evidence that U.S. credibility and leadership in Latin America is declining. The 
models of representative democracy and market-oriented economic policies implicit in 
the Summit of the Americas process are being challenged by Morales’s calls for direct, 
participatory, and “unmediated” forms of democracy—all of which have the potential to 
threaten liberal democracy itself. 
Washington’s reaction to Morales’s election, policies, and rhetoric has been to 
“wait and see.” Yet after a year in office, the Morales administration’s policy agenda has 
taken shape and, unfortunately, has exacerbated political, ethnic, and racial schisms in 
Bolivian society. Most people who follow Bolivian politics agree that the MAS’s 
aggressive policies, particularly President Morales’s insistence that a simple, 50 percent 
majority—versus a two-thirds majority—of the Constituent Assembly approve each 
article of a new constitution, have polarized Bolivians more than ever before. Despite 
Bolivia’s moderate macroeconomic growth over the past year, Morales’s once soaring 
popularity has declined substantially since the government adopted controversial 
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approaches to land reform, drug eradication, and natural resource management.1 
Furthermore, fears that the government will enact additional redistributive economic 
polices have exacerbated long-standing tensions between the country’s economically 
privileged and impoverished regions, prompting a series of violent protests and general 
political gridlock.  
The threat to stability and democratic governance in Bolivia, however, does not 
come from the Morales administration alone. In early 2007, after over six months of 
debate, President Morales agreed to stand by the original two-thirds majority requirement 
for line-item changes in the new constitution, but insisted that if a new constitution is not 
finalized before July 2, 2007, the process revert to the simple majority requirement in 
order to meet the Constituent Assembly’s August 6 deadline. The main opposition party, 
Democratic and Social Power Party (PODEMOS), refused to accept the MAS’s 
compromise offer, appearing intent on halting the process unless given an effective veto 
over all proposed articles and amendments. Morales has placed another compromise offer 
on the table, proposing that issues on which no agreement is achieved in the Constituent 
Assembly by July 2 should be submitted to a popular referendum. The opposition has yet 
to approve this proposal. In this light, the most salient threat to democracy stems from the 
unwillingness of all parties involved to exercise good faith in a process of constitutional 
reform demanded in the 2005 elections by the majority of Bolivia’s citizens.  
Other issues present equally difficult challenges for President Morales. Several 
regional governors, elected directly by the population for the first time in 2005, are 
seeking a relative degree of independence from the central government, creating tensions 
over jurisdiction and autonomy issues. In some cases, ethnic divisions parallel these 
political divides. At others, members of the same ethnic group have clashed in labor 
disputes. In short, the fault lines dividing Bolivian society are many and varied.  
As long as crisis persists, the United States will find it difficult to make progress 
on its traditional policy agenda in Bolivia. Indeed, should any of these tensions reach a 
boiling point, sparking widespread social unrest or violence, U.S. commercial, energy, 
                                                 
1 According to a September 2006 Apoyo Opinion poll, 52 percent of Bolivians approve of the job Morales 
is doing, down from 81 percent in July 2006. A Gallup International poll, published by the Bolivian 
newspaper El Deber on December 31, 2006, shows that 52 percent of those surveyed do not agree with the 
reelection of Morales as president of the republic. 
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security, and political interests in Bolivia and in the Andean rim subregion may be 
threatened. Despite their differences, Washington and the Morales administration have 
maintained a relatively cordial relationship. U.S. officials should continue developing ties 
to both the government and the opposition in order to emphasize that any overt attempt at 
destabilizing the democratic system by either will not be supported. Yet by and large, 
current U.S. policy tools—namely, trade, counternarcotics, military, and development 
assistance—do not provide Washington with sufficient leverage to unilaterally influence 
the direction of the Bolivian government. A legacy of widespread anti-American 
sentiment in the country does not position the United States as the best interlocutor.  
To support its own efforts, Washington must look to regional partners and open a 
transparent, multilateral dialogue about the implications of widespread social unrest in 
Bolivia. In particular, Bolivia’s direct neighbors, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, should be 
encouraged to approach the Morales government and the opposition in an effort to bring 
all sides to the negotiating table. With substantial economic and trade interests in Bolivia, 
each of these countries has the most to gain from a settlement of Bolivia’s turmoil and the 
preservation of a democratic government that respects minority voices. Thus far, there 
have been little or no coordinated discussions as each country sought to secure its 
individual bilateral interests with La Paz. A broader regional exchange is urgently 
needed, and the United States can take a leading role in initiating that process.  
As this regional agenda takes shape, Washington must prioritize conflict 
prevention over any individual item on the U.S.-Bolivia bilateral agenda. This involves 
using and even expanding current trade and development assistance to increase economic 
opportunity, bolster the independence of the Bolivian military, and deepen Bolivian civil 
society’s commitment to democratic compromise. It also involves showing flexibility on 
counternarcotics issues, staying away from politicized rhetoric, and generally avoiding 
policies that would provoke Bolivia’s ruling authorities and inhibit the ability of Bolivia’s 
neighbors to help create a framework for domestic consensus. For the most part, U.S. 
authorities have wisely followed this strategy, and they should continue to do so.  
If regional diplomacy fails, however, and the government opts for illiberal 
governance as a way out of its political difficulties, then there is no guarantee of 
continued U.S. aid. But presently, attempting to articulate specific “red lines” or establish 
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appropriate trade-offs is both premature and unwise. The actors in this conflict are still 
evolving, as are their intentions and motives.  
The alternative options—presenting a struggling government with ultimatums, 
isolating and weakening Morales, not discussing conflict management strategies with 
Bolivia’s neighbors, and in general isolating Bolivia and the Morales government—will 
increase the potential for political instability and social unrest in the region. Although 
specific policies of the Bolivian government, particularly its community coca eradication 
programs, may contradict traditional U.S. approaches, an unstable, conflict-ridden 
Bolivia would be a bigger headache for Bolivia’s neighbors, Latin America, and the 
United States. 
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THE RISE OF EVO MORALES 
The political rise of Evo Morales, which culminated in his election as president of 
Bolivia on December 18, 2005, is the product of a series of social, economic, and 
political factors over the past fifty years. 
  
ETHNO-CULTURAL, RACIAL, AND REGIONAL DIVIDES 
Bolivia stretches from the Amazonian basin in the east to the Andean highlands in the 
west, yet is landlocked by five neighbors: Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. 
Home to over 8 million people, and two times the size of France, Bolivia has thirty-six 
culturally distinct groups and nearly forty different mother tongues. Bolivia’s natural 
resources—including energy, minerals, timber, and a wide variety of agricultural 
products—are as diverse as its territory and peoples. From this description of Bolivia, one 
can imagine its tremendous potential for economic development and prosperity; one can 
also imagine the potential for conflict along cultural, economic, and political lines. 
President Morales’s rise to power reflects the slow and tense integration of 
indigenous populations, primarily the Aymara, Quechua, and Guarani peoples, into the 
Bolivian political system. Bolivia’s 1952 agrarian revolution, led by the National 
Revolutionary Movement (MNR), a loose coalition of mine workers, campesinos (farm 
workers), and middle-class mestizos, unleashed profound social and political changes, 
such as the nationalization of the mining industry, an extensive agrarian reform, and the 
adoption of universal political suffrage. Yet even though these reforms incorporated 
indigenous campesino sectors into the political system, they were tied into a party 
apparatus that subordinated their interests to those of the middle class and the MNR 
leadership. 
Bolivia’s subsequent eighteen-year period of intermittent military-based 
authoritarian rule (1964–82), especially the seven-year de facto government of General 
Hugo Banzer Suárez, saw the emergence of indigenous political parties and unions, 
including the Tupak Katari Revolutionary Movement of Liberation and the Unique 
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Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia. These groups, which had previously been 
controlled by the MNR and the military, served as precursors for the indigenous 
mobilizations that are at the core of MAS’s constituency today.  
The MAS party has direct roots in the cocalero (coca grower) movement. With 
the closing of Bolivia’s mines in 1985, layoffs forced some miners to join indigenous 
peoples in growing coca for a living. In 1995, a congress of cocaleros voted to build a 
political instrument to express their interests. This entity eventually became the MAS, 
and—in contrast to the 1950s—the party prioritized indigenous sectors’ interests over 
middle-class concerns. 
Any analysis of Morales’s emergence must consider the significance of regional 
factors. Bolivia is one of the least integrated countries in the hemisphere. Despite the 
inordinate growth of the central government, state authorities retain virtually no control 
over Bolivian territory. Historically, La Paz has struggled to impose authority in remote 
corners of the country, particularly the resource-rich southeastern lowlands. Disputes 
over land ownership, control of natural resources, the central government, and ethno-
cultural identity stimulate separatist aspirations in Santa Cruz, and, at times, the central 
valleys of Cochabamba. 
In addition to the ethnic and racial divides in Bolivia, these regional conflicts 
contributed to a crisis of political legitimacy, weakened the state’s ability to effectively 
govern the country’s territory, and produced even more constituencies unhappy with the 
traditional elites in La Paz—fertile ground for coalition building by the MAS. 
 
BOLIVIA’S COMPLEX TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND LIBERAL MARKETS 
Morales is a product, and beneficiary, of Bolivia’s uneasy transition to democracy and its 
efforts to follow a market-oriented development model. Culminating with the election in 
1982 of the weak coalition headed by Hernán Siles Zuazo (one of the four great leaders 
of the 1952 MNR revolution), democratic reforms brought hope to many Bolivians 
seeking progressive economic and social programs. Newly formed civil groups and 
political parties representing all sectors of society voiced their demands like never before.  
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Economic woes and political shortcomings, however, soon plagued the new 
government. Hyperinflation of historic proportions destabilized the economy, and 
political institutions were unable to channel the demands of citizen activists. Moreover, 
political parties failed to incorporate the new civil society opposition into the burgeoning 
decentralized democratic system. After the collapse of traditional labor unions such as the 
Bolivian Labor Central, informal sectors had few options for political action other than 
the coca growers’ union. Additionally, interventionist state policies led to the collapse of 
the tin mining industry, further fueling discontent. 
To stabilize the economy, three traditional political parties co-governed Bolivia 
between 1985 and 2005, alternating power under a “pacted democracy” scheme. Because 
of the pacted democracy arrangement, officials were able to push policies forward 
without inciting confrontations between the executive and legislative branches. During 
that same period, Bolivia’s leaders worked to encourage development through a New 
Economic Policy (NEP). By favoring the role of the private sector and eliminating labor 
market controls deemed inappropriate for attracting foreign investment, the NEP 
fundamentally transformed the structure of the economy. The privatization of state 
enterprises, including hydrocarbons, airlines, railroads, electricity, and 
telecommunications, soon followed. As a result, foreign direct investment increased 
significantly; by 1999 more than $1 billion had entered the national economy.  
This capital-intensive strategy, however, had little impact on improving 
employment levels and erasing poverty, issues with particular significance in a country 
where more than 70 percent of the economically active population works in the informal 
sector.2 The clientelistic nature of Bolivian democracy—with the perks and spoils of the 
pact system going to party supporters and traditional elites—deepened inequalities. By 
2000, confidence in the party system was at an all-time low. 
The great tragedy of Bolivian democracy is that despite some sincere efforts to 
incorporate the indigenous majority into mainstream politics these measures failed to 
foster equitable development. Poverty, unemployment, and institutionalized exclusion 
have resulted in two separate Bolivias: one urban, mestizo, and the beneficiary of the 
                                                 
2 According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), nearly 70 percent of Bolivia’s population is 
involved in the informal economy, which ranges from the illicit coca-cocaine complex to the vast web of 
urban street vendors that dot the country’s major cities. 
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process of democratization and economic reform; and the other indigenous and mestizo 
poor, urban and rural, and the bearer of the costs of economic development. A majority of 
Bolivians believe that poverty has grown and that inequalities have deepened since 1982. 
That belief is now the dominant accusation used by the MAS against the traditional 
parties of the pacted democracy and the economic strategy they imposed.3  
 
MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The Bolivian government’s moves toward decentralization and democratization in the 
1980s and 1990s could have provided a common political space in which pro-government 
elites and civil society groups might coexist. By raising expectations among alienated 
indigenous and metizo groups, and them failing to meet them, this process led to greater 
instability in the countryside.  
By the late 1990s, growing frustration with continued social exclusion, 
inequalities, poverty, and corruption led civil society networks to demand that a 
Constituent Assembly transform prevailing political, social, and economic structures. 
Groups also voiced more specific demands, such as the nationalization of water services. 
While all activists adopted these rallying cries, none did so more forcefully, and 
successfully, than Evo Morales. As a candidate of the MAS party in 1997, Morales 
scored the largest electoral success of any congressional deputy in Bolivia’s lower house 
by winning the single-member, coca-growing district of El Chapare with more than 70 
percent of the vote. Civil society groups, including cocaleros and other campesinos, 
made up the core of MAS’s constituency. 
Facing widespread protest by civil society groups, President Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada was forced to resign his second term in office in October 2003. To many 
observers, Sánchez de Lozada’s resistance to the demand for a new Constituent 
Assembly was the main factor responsible for his fall. Once unleashed, the forces that 
overthrew Sánchez de Lozada’s government realized that they could have a major say in 
                                                 
3 Depending on which economist you ask, Bolivia either reduced poverty rates during this twenty-year 
period (1982–2002) or experienced a significant poverty rate increase and a parallel process of deepening 
inequality. 
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running Bolivia. For many citizens, Evo Morales embodied this newfound power, and his 
arrival on the political scene demonstrated that groups perceived as outsiders, such as 
union leaders, coca farmers, and indigenous peoples, could be included in the political 
process.  
Carlos Mesa, the vice president who succeeded Sánchez de Lozada, essentially 
gave in to popular demands, believing that by modifying the constitution and convoking 
the Assembly his government would receive credit for transforming the country. But 
Mesa presided over a hapless government that combined almost comic populism with an 
open confrontation with the National Congress in an attempt to remain in office. In June 
2005, another series of protests led to the resignation of Mesa.  
The interim government of Eduardo Rodríguez was elected solely to preside over 
a new round of national elections to break what Vice President Alvaro García Linera 
today describes as the tie between the old system that refused to die and the new one that 
was yet to be born. The mobilization of civil society set up Morales to be the president 
under whose auspices a newly elected Constituent Assembly would “refound Bolivia.”  
 
THE COCA-COCAINE COMPLEX 
Coca-cocaine production remains deeply intertwined with social, economic, and political 
dynamics in Bolivia. Because coca remains a crop utilized by traditional indigenous 
cultures for medicinal purposes and in religious ceremonies, it is grown primarily by 
Bolivia’s indigenous population. Since the transition to democracy in the early 1980s, 
coca growers’ unions have substantially grown in strength and remained active in 
politics. Although Morales was the first coca grower to win a single-member district seat 
in the lower house, the unions sent representatives to the legislature under different party 
tickets as early as 1982. Along with pushing for more representation in the central 
government, coca growers’ union activism, characterized by road blockades, marches, 
and strikes, successfully resisted not only the imposition of U.S.-funded eradication 
efforts, but also the government’s neoliberal economic policies. 
At the same time, there is no easy separation between those who grow coca for 
medicinal, cultural, and religious purposes and those who produce coca, the raw material 
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in cocaine, for narcotrafficking. Coca farmers, displaced mine workers, military officers, 
traffickers, and political parties all participate in the illicit coca-cocaine economy that 
disrupts Bolivia’s politics and commerce. For example, the major roadway connecting 
eastern and western Bolivia runs through the geographically central, coca-producing 
Chapare region. When discontent, participants in the complex, including coca farmers, 
can halt the flow of goods and people from one side of the country to the other. The 
growth of this immense and intricate network, its concomitant web of corruption, and 
joint Bolivia-U.S. efforts to combat its proliferation all tax Bolivia’s weak political 
system and have ramifications beyond a law enforcement or national security perspective.  
The various actors in Bolivia’s coca-cocaine complex have been a critical element 
of support in Morales’s rise to power. In turn, Morales has not abandoned his role as coca 
union leader. Throughout his time as a congressional deputy, Morales worked actively on 
many legislative matters while still directing road blockades and other union strategies to 
protest counterdrug policies. Expectedly, such activities earned Morales the ire of 
traditional politicians, many of whom attempted to force the coca union leader out of the 
Chamber of Deputies. In 2000, authorities suspended Morales from Congress following a 
still unsolved incident that involved the kidnapping, torture, and execution of four police 
officers by coca growers, presumably under his orders. A definitive expulsion followed in 
February 2002, in the middle of national elections. Rather than hurting his public image, 
the scandal bolstered his 2002 presidential campaign.4 In June 2002, the MAS’s leader 
placed second only to former President Sánchez de Lozada, proving to all skeptics that he 
had become a national political force.  
Morales campaigned for the presidency on promises to encourage cultivation of 
the coca plant and, as president, Morales maintains a dual politician-cocalero activist 
role. On February 14, 2006, he was reelected head of the coca growers’ federation and 
promptly announced that unless the opposition parties in Congress voted in favor of his 
law to convoke the Constituent Assembly, he would order the coca growers to march on 
La Paz. Morales may now be a national leader with widespread support, but the coca 
growers will always be a praetorian guard he can mobilize to obtain specific gains. At the 
                                                 
4 Morales was expelled from the National Congress because he was formally charged with the kidnapping, 
torture, and assassination of the four police officers. He could not be tried if he remained in the legislature, 
because, like all members of the National Congress, he was immune from prosecution for any crime. 
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same time, Morales has reportedly named two civil society leaders as the heads of the 
People’s High Command, an organization intended to rally support for, and manage 
opposition to, the MAS.  
 
OUTSIDE FORCES 
Morales’s friendships with Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez have substantially aided his 
rise to power. Morales first traveled to Cuba in the late 1980s, where he began forging 
relationships with high-level Cuban officials. His initial contacts were established 
through the traditional parties of the Bolivian left that Morales now dismisses as corrupt. 
Over the years, members of the various coca growers’ unions have benefited from 
academic scholarships for study in Cuba arranged by Morales. Current Cuban assistance, 
including scholarships and a highly publicized literacy campaign in Bolivia, should be 
seen as a logical progression of these early exchanges.  
Since at least 2001, Morales has also benefited from a close relationship with 
Hugo Chávez. Chávez publicly supported the MAS and acknowledged that he advised 
Morales during the Bolivian presidential election.5 In many regards, he has served as 
Morales’s political mentor—he counseled Morales in international affairs, introduced 
him to dignitaries, and flew him on the Venezuelan presidential plane to the 
inaugurations of other Latin American presidents, including Chilean President Michelle 
Bachelet.  
As president-elect, Morales visited Havana and Caracas to thank his international 
supporters. In turn, Chávez attended Morales’s inauguration and used the opportunity to 
announce the opening of an office of Venezuelan Petroleum, S.A. (PDVSA), the national 
oil company of Venezuela, in Bolivia. Chávez has also increased the presence of 
Venezuelan advisers in areas ranging from health and education to hydrocarbons and the 
national identification system. Castro followed suit with promises of ambitious literacy 
and health care programs, disaster assistance projects, and 5,000 scholarships for 
                                                 
5 Simon Tisdall, “Chávez the Bush Baiter,” Guardian (London), November 25, 2005.  
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Bolivian students. David Choquehuanca, Bolivia’s foreign minister, described these 
efforts as “integration of the people of these countries in all aspects.”  
Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to explain Morales’s political rise by 
pointing solely to the influence of Cuba and Venezuela. Other Latin American states, 
particularly Brazil and Argentina, have a stake in Bolivian politics to meet their energy 
needs and protect business investments. It is accurate, however, to state that Morales was 
also, in part, the unintended creation of an aggressive U.S. counterdrug policy.  
For nearly three decades, U.S. counterdrug policy in the Andean region has been 
driven by a supply-side crop eradication strategy. U.S. efforts in Bolivia have emphasized 
the forceful eradication of coca crops in the Chápare region, the subtropical region in 
which thousands of poor farmers produce most of the Bolivian coca, through the 
involvement of police and military units. The carrot components of the strategy include 
massive financial, development, and military assistance. However, if the United States 
uses its international drug certification process to judge the Bolivian government 
uncooperative with U.S. counternarcotics efforts, sanctions such as bilateral aid cuts, 
vetoes of loans from international financial institutions, and exclusion from market access 
agreements could be enacted.  
In the late 1990s the policy achieved a dramatic short-term reduction in coca 
production, but at a very high cost. Aggressive eradication operations by security forces 
led to widespread human rights abuses, such as excessive use of force, arbitrary 
detention, and the suppression of peaceful demonstrations. Some economists calculated 
that the Bolivian economy lost as much as $700 million annually, leaving thousands of 
coca growers unemployed but still tied to their unions. Furthermore, U.S.-funded 
alternative livelihood programs failed to convince farmers to give up growing coca.  
This policy boosted Morales’s popularity and catapulted him into the political 
limelight. Since at least 1988, U.S. ambassadors made extraordinary efforts to demonize 
Morales and accuse him of links to narcotrafficking. Regardless of the merit of these 
accusations, which Morales categorically denies, they helped the indigenous leader 
cultivate his now mythic reputation, consolidate his national political movement, and run 
a disciplined and successful presidential campaign.  
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 Morales’s well-executed campaign strategy, complete with an excellent set of 
television and radio spots, stands in stark contrast to the disorganized, reactive, and 
unimaginative campaigns of the establishment candidates. Jorge Quiroga of PODEMOS, 
Samuel Doria Medina of the National Unity Front, and Michiaki Nagatani of the MNR 
failed to capture voters outside of their reduced electoral bases. More importantly, they 
lost the middle class in droves. On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales easily defeated 
U.S.-educated Quiroga to become president of Bolivia.  
 Quiroga’s defeat marked the last breath of Bolivia’s traditional party system. In 
the end, corruption was the main theme in the election; surveys suggest that the average 
Bolivian opted for change with Morales even though they did not know what his 
presidency would bring. Winning 53.7 percent of the vote, Morales became the first 
president since the 1982 transition to have been elected without a congressional second 
round, as called for by the constitution. This factor alone gives Morales greater 
legitimacy than any of his predecessors.  
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CHALLENGES FACING THE MORALES GOVERNMENT 
The Morales government clearly intends to restore the authority of the state in economic 
decision-making. This is evident in its push to “nationalize but not expropriate” the 
hydrocarbons sector and possibly other enterprises capitalized in the 1990s. But the 
government will face multiple challenges in reaching that aim and in empowering the 
country’s indigenous majority. Obstacles include building a coalition for constitutional 
change in the Constituent Assembly, addressing movements for regional autonomy, 
reconciling labor conflicts, implementing hydrocarbons, mining, and land reform 
policies, and managing international relationships. As events in recent months have 
shown, developments in each of these areas have the potential to damage Morales’s 
popularity, spark social unrest, and threaten democratic governance. 
 
“REFOUNDING” BOLIVIA THROUGH THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY  
After Morales’s landslide presidential victory, the MAS government hoped to score 
another electoral triumph in the July 2 Constituent Assembly contest. An Assembly with 
a two-thirds majority of MAS followers would have furthered Morales’s plans to 
empower the country’s indigenous majority while creating a serious crisis for the 
Bolivian opposition. The MAS, however, won only 137 seats in the 255-member body, 
just over 50 percent of seats. The PODEMOS alliance won sixty seats; the remaining 
fifty-eight seats are divided among fourteen other political parties.6 As it stands, MAS 
does not control the two-thirds majority needed to exert absolute control and ease the 
passage of constitutional changes.  
Under existing rules, both the MAS and the opposition should be forced to build 
coalitions in the new assembly to achieve their political goals. At the inaugural meeting 
of the Constituent Assembly, however, the MAS and President Morales insisted on a 
simple majority to approve each article of a new constitution. This move contradicted the 
laws and the spirit that led to the election and aggravated already serious tensions 
                                                 
6 “Bolivia Assembly Shows Vote Split,” BBC News, July 11, 2006. 
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between Morales and PODEMOS. In the months since the Constituent Assembly first 
assembled, PODEMOS, other opposition parties, and traditional elites from Bolivia’s 
south and east fought hard against the simple majority rules of debate adopted by the pro-
government constituent assembly members.  
As described earlier, in January 2007 the MAS made a partial concession to the 
opposition’s demands, agreeing to enforce a two-thirds majority for all line-item changes 
to the constitution until July 2, when a simple majority rule would take effect to ensure 
the speedy finalization of the process. When the main opposition party, PODEMOS, 
refused to accept the MAS’s offer, Morales offered another concession, proposing that 
issues on which no agreement is achieved in the Constituent Assembly by July 2 should 
be submitted to a popular referendum. Although the opposition has yet to approve this 
proposal, the leader of PODEMOS, former President Jorge Quiroga, has welcomed the 
plan.  
Part of the opposition’s intransigence on the question of the Constituent Assembly 
stems from the way in which its mandate has been characterized by the Morales 
administration. In describing the process through which the government hopes to 
“refound” Bolivia’s institutions, Morales has frequently used the term originario 
(original, native). While this term on the one hand refers to the idea of a new beginning, it 
also implicitly links the endeavor to Bolivia’s indigenous roots. This symbolic 
association alienates and infuriates those members of Bolivian society who do not share 
the same perspective. For this reason, confrontation between indigenous Bolivians and 
the regional, mestizo, and white elites—despite all of the conflicts within both sides—
have emerged in Constituent Assembly proceedings. Whether or not the Constituent 
Assembly can complete its task and accept minority party influence will have major 
repercussions for security and stability in Bolivia. 
Outside of the Constituent Assembly, threats to transparent democracy exist. In 
November 2006, President Morales proposed disbanding the Senate after that body 
registered its opposition to the government’s land reform proposals. Then, in late 
December, Morales appointed four MAS loyalists to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court, 
increasing the likelihood that judges will be subordinated to the imperatives of the 
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executive. These moves have intensified the anger of the opposition and raise serious 
concerns about the Morales government’s commitment to pluralist democracy. 
 
MANAGING REGIONAL DEMANDS 
For Morales to maintain national unity, refound Bolivia in the Constituent Assembly, and 
preserve access to the energy resources in those regions that sustain the Bolivian 
economy, he, his administration, and the MAS must work to address the concerns of 
Bolivia’s diverse regions. Primarily, President Morales must manage ongoing 
restlessness and pressure for greater autonomy from the lowland, eastern regions, or 
departments. 
In the midst of the mobilizations against the Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa 
governments, the people of the Santa Cruz department launched a movement for 
departmental autonomy. In January 2005, pro-autonomy groups mobilized 500,000 
people demanding that the Mesa government convoke a binding referendum on the 
question of departmental autonomy. Above all, those departments demand increased 
control over the collection and spending of revenues derived from their land and natural 
resources. Although departmental prefectos (governors) were directly elected for the first 
time in December 2005, and decentralization efforts have already vastly increased the 
size of public funds for those states, local authorities remain unsatisfied and anxious for 
greater power and greater access to state resources. 
The government gave in and agreed that the referendum would be held on July 2, 
2006, the same date as the vote for the Constituent Assembly demanded by highland 
indigenous groups. In the end, 57 percent of voters opposed granting departmental 
authorities more autonomy. Only four out of Bolivia’s nine departments voted in favor of 
increased political and economic independence: Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando, and Beni, the 
resource-rich parts of the country. Demands for autonomy, however, did not abate after 
the referendum. Rather, tensions have escalated as deliberations in the Constituent 
Assembly aggravate ethnic, racial, and regional differences. 
As 2006 came to a close, these regional tensions, coupled with the discussion over 
the two-thirds vote, had effectively split the country in two. A hunger strike staged by 
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hundreds of members of the opposition, middle-class intellectuals, and the Santa Cruz, 
Tarija, and Beni departments’ civic committees became the most serious social challenge 
facing the Morales government. The government’s response was to stage its own 
countersocial mobilization, accusing the hunger strikers of undermining the agenda for 
fundamental change launched by the government. Throughout these conflicts, no internal 
mediating institution or force was visible, and Bolivians appeared headed toward an 
inevitable clash.  
In early 2007 regional tensions reached new heights and raised serious concerns 
about the direction of sociopolitical conflict in Bolivia. In January, coca growers from the 
Chapare Valley joined MAS deputies and other labor activists in a government-sponsored 
march and demonstration in the city of Cochabamba to demand the resignation of 
Manfred Reyes Villa, the elected governor of the department, who had called for a 
second national referendum on regional autonomy. In the ensuing confrontation with the 
prefect’s defenders, a coca grower was shot dead and a middle-class “white” teenager 
died as a result of being tortured and strangled by a mob of coca growers. Although Vice 
President García Linera refused to recognize a parallel departmental government elected 
by the marchers, the violent confrontations died down after European ambassadors 
expressed concern over the direction of Bolivian democracy.7 
The Cochabamba incidents suggest that the traditional regional cleavages have 
deepened as a result of a racial-ethnic divide promoted in part by the government. The 
events also demonstrate a troubling reliance by the Morales administration on social 
organizations to control dissent of any kind. The overtly racial nature of both deaths is the 
most serious warning that Bolivia is headed toward a severe racially based confrontation 
that exacerbates existing regional tensions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The U.S. Embassy made no public comment on the Cochabamba situation; as result, it was only European 
messages to President Morales that apparently swayed the government to order the coca growers and other 
groups to abandon their attempts to topple Reyes Villa.  
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FULFILLING CAMPAIGN PROMISES 
Morales’s primary challenge was to translate his campaign pledges, particularly those 
that involve resource redistribution, into a formula that retains and encourages foreign 
investment, holds Bolivia’s nine diverse states together, and simultaneously persuades the 
Bolivians who voted for him that he has not gone back on his promises.  
 
Hydrocarbons Policy 
 
During the Sánchez de Lozada government (1993–97), Bolivia embarked on a significant 
initiative that opened the hydrocarbons sector to foreign investment through a 
privatization strategy known as capitalization. Capitalization involved selling 50 percent 
of the Bolivian State Petroleum Agency (YPFB), plus management, to the highest bidder. 
The remaining 50 percent was used to privatize the country’s pension system. By the late 
1990s, YPFB had essentially disappeared, and foreign companies invested over $1 billion 
in the hydrocarbons sector. Those foreign companies were responsible for developing the 
natural gas reserves that now rank second only to Venezuela.  
One of President Morales’s major campaign promises was to end what he called 
the looting of Bolivia’s natural resources by foreign companies. To begin reforming the 
hydrocarbons sector, Morales imposed a law calling on foreign energy enterprises to pay 
significantly higher taxes, accept all terms of new legislation, and work with a resurrected 
YPFB. The strategy was to strengthen YPFB with revenues forthcoming from natural gas 
sales and the investments of foreign companies, such as PDVSA (Venezuela), Petrobras 
(Brazil), Repsol-YPF (Spain), British Gas and British Petroleum (Great Britain), Total 
(France), and Exxon Mobil (United States). 
The rules of the game changed dramatically on May 1, 2006, however, when 
Morales announced the nationalization of the energy industry. Foreign companies 
operating in Bolivia were ordered to negotiate new contracts with the YPFB and cede the 
majority of control to the Bolivian government within 180 days. Bolivia is demanding 
that the previous mode of profit sharing be reversed, from 18 percent in royalties to 
Bolivia and the rest to principal energy companies, to an 82 percent share—in the form of 
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taxes and royalty earnings—and the rest for the companies.8 Companies were offered a 
buy-back scheme, but Morales stated publicly that he did not intend to compensate any 
company that has recouped its original investment. Under these new regulations, if by 
November 1, 2006, a company refused to accept the terms of the audit, the Bolivian state 
could have expropriated its assets and effectively forced it out of the country without any 
type of compensation. As this date came and went, all companies appeared to accept the 
terms as the government triumphantly announced that a number of new agreements had 
been settled upon.  
The move was politically popular in Bolivia. Bolivian officials were always 
confident that their relationships with the energy corporations would continue to provide 
mutual benefits. Antonio Brufau, president of the Spanish-Argentine hydrocarbons 
consortium Repsol-YPF, announced in June 2006 that the company would continue 
negotiations with the Bolivian government following the nationalization decree, but has 
also made it clear that if the company was not wanted in Bolivia, it would leave: “Bolivia 
is not critical for the future of Repsol,” but Repsol is important for Bolivia.9 Repsol is the 
second-largest oil and gas company operating in Bolivia, accounting for approximately 
27 percent of Bolivian gas reserves prior to nationalization, after Petrobras, which 
controls 46 percent.  
Although Petrobras, Repsol, and other international companies did sign 
agreements with the Bolivian government that allow them to continue operations in 
Bolivia under state control, the nationalization decision has strained Bolivia’s relations 
with its neighbors and business partners. Bolivia-Brazil relations were temporarily 
damaged over the way in which Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned energy company that has 
invested more than $1.5 billion in Bolivia, was treated. Negotiations over the price that 
Brazil will pay for Bolivian gas have still not been completed, though the tone of 
discussion has improved of late. Bolivia’s cozy relations with Venezuela (which promises 
to invest) and Argentina (which agreed to pay higher prices for natural gas) created and 
exacerbated these serious tensions with Brazil. The Brazilian government announced that 
                                                 
8 Alma Guillermoprieto, “The New Bolivia: II,” the New York Review of Books, Volume 53, No. 14, 
September 21, 2006. 
9 Juliette Kerr, “Repsol YPF Considers Possibility of Exiting Bolivia,” Global Insight, World Markets 
Research Ltd., June 19, 2006; “Bolivia to Sign Nationalization Deals with Foreign Oil Companies,” 
Associated Press, October 28, 2006. 
 22 
it would freeze all future investments in Bolivia and would not pay higher prices for gas. 
Even the goodwill developed between Bolivia and Chile during the inauguration of 
Chilean President Bachelet appears to have been lost as a result of the Bolivian 
government’s conditioning of natural gas sales to Argentina on a prohibition to resell the 
fuel to Chile. Similarly, relations with Spain and Great Britain were affected by the 
Bolivian government’s new hydrocarbons policy.  
Internal difficulties have also surfaced. La Paz lacks the resources necessary to 
buy back the hydrocarbons industry from foreign investors. Bolivia’s government was 
forced to call a “temporary suspension” to its plan to take a greater stake in the country’s 
energy sector, citing lack of funds and expertise. Also in late August, Bolivia’s Senate 
passed a motion of censure against Andrés Solíz, the hydrocarbons minister, for botching 
the nationalization and for alleged corruption at YPFB. Amid corruption allegations, 
Jorge Alvarado stepped down as the head of YPFB, which is charged with managing the 
nationalization policy. Then, in late September, Solíz presented his resignation, 
confirming the very serious strains in the government’s hydrocarbons negotiating team. It 
was only under Carlos Villegas, a new, more pragmatic minister, that the Bolivian 
government moved toward signing agreements with the foreign companies.  
Despite these problems, the prognosis for the Bolivian economy remains positive 
in the short run. High natural gas prices, restructured agreements with foreign entities 
operating within Bolivia, and new export contracts signed with Argentina have produced 
a windfall for the government. This revenue has in turn fueled those regional tensions 
discussed earlier, with gas-rich provinces demanding a greater portion of profits than 
other parts of the country. In this way, questions of regional autonomy and resource 
nationalism are closely intertwined. In the mid to long term, the industry’s financial 
security is less assured. Without significant foreign investment, current revenue streams 
may disappear, along with Morales’s domestic political strength. 
 
Labor and Industry 
 
Not all labor groups support Morales. The Bolivian Workers’ Central, for example, has 
always doubted Morales’s union credentials beyond the coca sector. In order to reach its 
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political goals and avoid further civil unrest, the Morales government must quickly find a 
formula to co-opt dissent, much of which now revolves around organized labor groups 
historically supportive of the MAS.  
In early October 2006, rival groups of miners from Huanuni, Bolivia’s largest and 
most lucrative tin mine, fought one another for two days using guns and dynamite, 
leaving at least sixteen dead and causing more than $2 million worth of damage. The 
dispute centered on competing claims between employees of the state mining company, 
Comibol, and members of the newer cooperative miners union, Fencomin. Comibol 
members claimed that they earn far less for their labor than Fencomin. For their part, 
Fencomin workers demanded access to larger portions of the mine. Violence began when 
Fencomin attempted to stage a takeover of the entire facility. The Morales administration 
responded clumsily to the violence and has been widely criticized for allowing the battle 
to escalate before sending in security forces. Conflicts like that at Huanuni may be 
repeated if Morales follows through with stated plans to nationalize the mining industry 
in 2007. 
Labor unrest may spill over into other sectors as well, particularly the coca 
industry. Morales’s cocalero base resides in the Chapare, the La Paz Yungas Valley, and 
in the area known as Yapacani in Santa Cruz. These sectors have enjoyed a privileged 
relationship with the president and limited eradication efforts have been occurring in 
those areas. That is not the case in the Yunga de Vandiola reserves, where a clash 
between military police eradicating forces and cocaleros occurred on September 29, 
leaving two cocaleros dead and several soldiers injured. Rather than defending their 
rights to grow coca peacefully, the Morales government accused cocaleros in the reserves 
of working with narcotraffickers.10 After cocalero women there staged a hunger strike 
and set up a blockade on the old road linking the Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and 
Chuquisaca departments, the Morales government brokered a compromise agreement. 
Nonetheless, cocaleros in the region are rethinking their relationship with the president. 
As these examples show, the potential sources of instability in Bolivian society do 
not fall strictly along ethnic lines. The Morales administration’s decisions regarding coca 
issues are creating rifts among indigenous cocaleros. The conflict at Huanuni pitted 
                                                 
10 “Muerte de lose cocaleros pone en vilo erradicación pacifica de Evo,” Los Tiempos, September 30, 2006. 
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indigenous Bolivians against one another and presented the Morales team with a 
particularly difficult choice. Fencomin, the principal actor in the El Alto riots of October 
2003 that forced President Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation and an important supporter 
of Morales’s campaign for the presidency, expected the president to back its demands. 
These expectations were heightened by the fact that one of its former leaders, Walter 
Villaroel, was serving as minister of mining. Employees of the state-owned company, on 
the other hand, justifiably hoped the government would take responsibility for their well-
being.  
These events suggest that Morales, despite the persona he has tried to cultivate, is 
in many ways a traditional Bolivian political actor who doles out patronage to major 
supporters while simultaneously condemning those who came before him for doing the 
same. Like previous regimes, the Morales administration and the MAS will face serious 
challenges in managing conflicting interests. Because MAS is still a very loose coalition 
of a wide variety of interests, achieving this balance will be challenging. Recognizing 
this, Morales and his strategic team increasingly see appeals to race and ethnicity as the 
only way to glue the MAS and Bolivia together.  
 
Land Issues 
 
In the five decades since the 1952 Revolution launched bold agrarian reforms, land tenure 
patterns in Bolivia have returned to prerevolution extremes. Land ownership in the 
western part of the country has reconcentrated. Bolivian military rulers and 
democratically elected leaders alike have doled out land holdings to political supporters 
and relatives.  
Land reform was a major component of the MAS campaign platform, as the 
concentration of land ownership in Bolivia is among the highest in Latin America. On 
May 30, the government announced, on the basis of the 1996 Agrarian Reform Law, an 
ambitious plan to redistribute 20 million hectares of land to indigenous, mestizo, and 
campesino communities. A new law authorizing the National Institute of Agrarian 
Reform to expropriate land—once an official investigation has established the necessity 
and usefulness for doing so—was squeezed through Bolivia’s Congress in November 
2006. Although Bolivian government officials have been quick to point out that all of the 
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land redistributed thus far was state-owned, Morales has indicated that his government 
will eventually seize private holdings that are judged not to be in productive use.  
Redistributing around one-fifth of Bolivia’s total land area over the next five 
years—Morales’s target—will prove difficult. Implementation involves disentangling 
centuries of real estate records, determining and acknowledging those landholders who 
claim legitimate rights to their property, finding seed money for new farms, and 
managing resistance from landowners. Land redistribution is a source of ongoing dispute 
between the central government and elites in eastern and southern Bolivia who fear the 
government will confiscate their land. Complicating the issue, the Morales government 
seems unable to control land-less campesino and indigenous groups that believe the 
reform gives them carte blanche to invade private lands. Land seizures by itinerant 
farmers also pose a serious threat to large expanses of environmentally protected areas.  
No matter how the Morales government pursues this issue over the next few 
months, it is likely to generate serious, perhaps violent conflict, shake private sector 
confidence in investments in Bolivia, and increase the fervor of movements seeking 
greater departmental autonomy. 
 
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
The Bolivian government has recently voiced its desire to formulate a multilateral foreign 
policy characterized by fruitful relationships with a variety of countries, such as Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, members of the European Union, and the United States. While 
openly recognizing Morales’s friendship with Hugo Chávez and expressing gratitude for 
the extensive aid and “friendship” of Venezuela and Cuba, representatives of the Bolivian 
government firmly reject any suggestion that Caracas is “casting a shadow” over La Paz. 
Officials stress that their international agenda reflects the priorities of the Bolivian 
people, not any foreign government. 
As evidence, officials cite a $120 million loan pledged by the Argentine 
government in July 2006, ongoing negotiations with Mexico’s national oil company to 
help industrialize the natural gas industry and acquire subsidized petroleum imports, and 
a continuing effort to secure equitable, long-term trade agreements with the United States 
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and Europe. Moreover, the Morales government hopes to work with Argentina and Brazil 
to provide technical assistance and training to impoverished Bolivian farmers. 
Negotiations with Chile to obtain pipeline access to the Pacific Ocean are pending, as are 
discussions about the possibility of Paraguayan entities purchasing Bolivian natural gas. 
Developing such a diverse foreign policy agenda is indeed a worthy and 
appropriate goal. However, although the U.S. government has largely ignored Morales’s 
incendiary anti-U.S. rhetoric and controversial policies thus far, a continued antagonistic 
tone from La Paz jeopardizes crucial elements of Morales’s plan. 
 
Trade Relations 
 
Trade relations with the United States and the nations of the Andean community pose a 
difficult challenge for the Morales administration. In particular, the recently signed U.S.-
Colombia Free Trade Agreement has endangered Bolivian soy exports. Soy is by far the 
single most important agricultural export commodity of Bolivia, accounting for 27 
percent of total export revenues. In 2004, over 92 percent of Bolivian soy exports were 
sent to other Andean nations.11 The U.S.-Colombia accord will permit heavily subsidized 
American soybean products to enter Colombia, knocking out Bolivian crops. Yet, 
because antitrade rhetoric was a significant component of his campaign platform, the new 
Bolivian president has few tools at his disposal with which to develop an effective 
response. Colombia has assured Bolivia that the agreement will not prevent Bolivian soy 
from entering the Colombian market.12 Nonetheless, trade relations between the United 
States and other Andean countries could inhibit Bolivia’s regional trade relations and 
severely damage its economy. 
Morales uses any setback as an opportunity to respond aggressively. His 
unrehearsed response called for the immediate founding of a People’s Free Trade Treaty 
(TCP), whereby participants would respect each nation’s interests and promote “real” 
integration. Cuba and Venezuela signed on at the same time that Bolivia became part of 
                                                 
11 Jan Maarten Dros, “Managing the Soy Boom: Two Scenarios of Soy Production Expansion in South 
America,” AIDEnvironment (Amsterdam), June 2004, p. 19. The last year for which full data is available is 
2004. 
12 “Colombian-U.S. Trade Deal Will Not Hurt Bolivian Soy Exports, Minister Says,” BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, April 18, 2006. 
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the Bolivarian Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALBA), an initiative led by Castro and 
Chávez. Chávez has pledged to buy all Bolivian soy production and work with Bolivia on 
energy integration schemes.  
The implications of Morales’s anti-U.S. rhetoric and Bolivia’s increased reliance 
on trade with Venezuela and Cuba must be examined carefully. The Bolivian president 
seems to believe that he can denounce U.S. bilateral trade agreements, appear with 
Chávez at anti-imperialist rallies, and simultaneously ask Washington for an 
unconditional extension of preferential access for Bolivian products in the U.S. market 
through the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA). Morales’s 
contradictions belie the fact that the ATPDEA agreement is critical for the health of the 
Bolivian economy.  
Under ATPDEA provisions, the United States lifts the barriers for goods from 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to enter its market, in exchange for drug control 
measures taken in those countries. ATPDEA preferences were set to expire at the end of 
2006. The White House asked the U.S. Congress to extend the agreement as it continues 
to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with individual Andean states. On December 8, 
Congress renewed the duty preferences for another six months. After that, Congress will 
grant another six-month extension only to countries with bilateral trade deals in place 
with Washington.  
Given that the Morales government endorsed Chávez’s accusation that the United 
States’ FTAs with Colombia and Peru have undermined the Andean Community of 
Nations (CAN)—and because Morales has been quoted repeatedly in the Bolivian press 
arguing that the only way that the CAN could be jumpstarted would be for Colombia and 
Peru to give up their FTAs—it is not likely that ATPDEA preferences for Bolivia will be 
renewed in mid-2007. There have been some indications that a long-term extension of 
ATPDEA is not completely off the table. In fact, the incoming chair of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, Charles Rangel (D-NY), suggested that he would pursue exactly 
this option. Still, securing the necessary legislative support for such a move may be 
difficult under the new U.S. Congress. 
Aside from sending high-level delegations to the United States in July and 
September to lobby for the extension of the ATPDEA, the Bolivian government has done 
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little to prepare for offsetting the serious impact on the Bolivian economy of what 
appears to be its inevitable termination. Paradoxically, President Morales’s own visit to 
the United States in late September and his incendiary speech at the United Nations 
undermined rather than supported Bolivia’s case for long-term ATPDEA extension. If 
allowed to expire in 2007, the effects will be felt in sectors such as gems, textiles, and 
furniture exports. According to the U.S. Embassy in La Paz, approximately 150,000 jobs 
could be lost. The real number is probably closer to 80,000; nonetheless, this figure is 
three times the number of miners (23,000) who were fired in 1985 with the closing of the 
tin mines. Even on the off chance that Bolivia’s demands are pushed through the U.S. 
Congress, the extension is likely to last only for an additional year, at which point La Paz 
would be compelled to negotiate a bilateral FTA with Washington or lose preferences. 
Also unclear is what the Morales administration will do if Caracas is unable to live up to 
its promises of increased trade and assistance. 
One step Bolivia has recently taken to perhaps offset these potential losses is to 
seek admission as a full member of Mercosur (Bolivia is currently an associate member). 
However, a January 2007 summit of the trading bloc’s leaders produced no definitive 
progress on this front. Though heavily backed by Venezuela, Bolivia’s candidacy is 
controversial because La Paz also hopes to retain its membership in CAN, an 
unprecedented move. Both the economic implications of Bolivia’s accession to Mercosur, 
as well as the willingness of the existing member states to accept Bolivia’s candidacy, 
remain unclear. 
 
Coca-Cocaine 
 
Morales campaigned on promises to encourage coca leaf production and to pressure the 
international community to address the consumption side of the cocaine problem. In his 
dual role as president and head of the coca growers’ federation, President Morales named 
a coca grower as Bolivia’s drug czar, suspended all forceful coca eradication efforts, and 
vowed to continue to shift the focus of Bolivian drug control programs away from 
targeting subsistence farming families, dependent on sale of the coca leaf to feed their 
families, to the interdiction of cocaine in all stages of production. Morales’s supporters 
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believe that the new approach, involving voluntary eradication of coca, communal 
interdiction, and efforts to industrialize the coca leaf, are having important and positive 
effects. They argue that coca production has dropped and that the government’s focus is 
on promoting a genuine shift toward alternative sources of income. 
From the U.S. perspective, the Bolivian coca-cocaine issue, with its ramifications 
for international narcotrafficking, is perhaps the most serious policy challenge posed by 
the Morales administration. Morales’s pledge to end the “zero coca” campaign and shift 
to a “zero cocaine” strategy, has ruffled the feathers of staunch U.S. drug warriors 
convinced that Morales is opening the door to increased cocaine production. These U.S. 
officials believe that the original Law 1008, the 1988 U.S.-designed counternarcotics 
policy, should be maintained and that forced eradication programs should continue—
even though under that program coca production in Bolivia increased steadily since 2000 
and the U.S. street price of cocaine has gone down. 
Remarkably, the Morales administration has permitted U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) officials to continue exercising significant control over interdiction efforts 
in Bolivia under its new policies, and U.S. diplomats have forged a successful, if 
somewhat tenuous, working relationship with their Bolivian counterparts. In September 
2006, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
announced that the United States had established “benchmarks” that Bolivia had to meet 
over the next six months in order to continue to receive U.S. counternarcotics assistance. 
By meeting its 2006 goal of eradicating 5,000 hectares of coca fields, one benchmark was 
met. Furthermore, U.S. authorities agreed that there has been a significant increase in 
interdiction efforts since Morales came to power. 
Nonetheless, shortly after the Bolivians announced that they were reforming Law 
1008 and increasing the size of legally permitted coca crops in the country to 20,000 
hectares (from a previous maximum of 12,000), U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia David 
Goldberg reported that U.S. counterdrug aid would decrease in 2007 to $33.8 million 
from a 2006 allocation of $45 million.13 Despite assurances from the Bolivians that much 
of the increased production will be “industrialized” and incorporated into such products 
                                                 
13 “U.S. Government Reduces to $33.8 Million Aid for Anti-Drug Activities in Bolivia 2007,” AII Data 
Processing Ltd., December 22, 2006. 
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as tea, medicine, and shampoo, some U.S. officials doubt the reliability of the 
government’s plan. 
 
Development Assistance 
 
Bolivia has one of the highest per capita dependencies on foreign funds in the 
hemisphere. As of 2005, for example, 11 percent of Bolivia’s national budget depended 
on donor assistance and external financing.14 About eighteen multilateral and bilateral 
donors and some nine UN agencies annually provide an average of $500 million in 
concessional loans and donations to Bolivia. While Bolivia has made important progress 
toward social and economic development, Bolivia’s social indicators (poverty, education, 
health, and nutrition) are among the lowest in the hemisphere, ahead of only Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Haiti despite its natural resources and significant international assistance. 
Morales is confident that his government can tackle Bolivia’s development issues. 
He appears to believe that Venezuelan promises of monetary assistance and loans will 
materialize, that Bolivia can attract foreign investment, and that Bolivia can secure the 
nearly $600 million of Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funds for which it 
submitted a proposal to the U.S. government on December 1, 2005. Practically speaking, 
expanded Venezuelan support may materialize. However, if internal divisions escalate 
and domestic stability deteriorates, foreign investment may not. Moreover, at this point 
there is no guarantee that Bolivia will receive MCA funds. These uncertainties make 
continued international assistance important to Bolivia’s long-run development.  
 
                                                 
14 USAID, USAID/Bolivia Country Strategic Plan 2005–2009, April 6, 2005, p. 10. 
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U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Bolivian elections have never aroused much interest in Washington. The 2005 vote was 
an exception due to the combination of indigenous factors at play and anxiety about 
Morales’s policy stances. President George W. Bush’s congratulatory phone call to 
Morales in late January 2006 was meant to signal that the United States would seek to 
work with the new Bolivian government regardless of their differences. Despite concern 
about Morales’s ties to Cuba and Venezuela, at the recommendation of former U.S. 
Ambassador to Bolivia David N. Greenlee, the United States adopted a “wait and see” 
policy.  
Since his election, Morales has publicly attacked the United States and its 
leadership, calling President Bush a terrorist, poking fun at Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, and accusing the U.S. government of sending a terrorist to bomb 
Bolivian hotels. His approaches to the Constituent Assembly, land reform, and the 
hydrocarbons industry have infuriated major interest groups and brought Bolivia to the 
brink of violent conflict. U.S. government representatives at all levels have refused to 
respond with incendiary rhetoric or panic, but thus far Morales has deflected most 
levelheaded attempts to convince his administration that respecting minority parties is in 
its interest. The opposition has proven to be equally stubborn and has thus far pursued a 
strategy of confrontation meant to challenge the Morales administration’s ability to 
govern. 
To prevent a further escalation of violence and social unrest, the United States 
must prioritize conflict prevention over any particular item on the traditional U.S.-Bolivia 
policy agenda. It is vital that the United States work actively with regional partners to 
ensure the continuity of democratic governance and encourage a constructive dialogue 
between the government and the organized opposition. 
In the best of circumstances, U.S. officials could leverage aid and trade benefits to 
encourage Bolivian officials and the opposition to settle their differences. Failure to 
renew a serious dialogue and pursue compromise through democratic, nonviolent 
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avenues would, in this scenario, prompt relevant cutoffs in development assistance and 
trade preferences.  
Unfortunately, at this stage, the threat of sanctions by the United States alone is 
unlikely to have a short-term effect on the actions of either side. The biggest threat that 
Washington can deploy in economic terms, ending trade preferences, is already looming 
over La Paz. While Bolivian officials are undoubtedly worried about the economic 
consequences of losing benefits under ATPDEA, they will not be coerced to the 
negotiating table. In other words, external threats are unlikely to force the MAS to 
compromise its domestic agenda. Regardless, the Bush administration is currently bound 
to a country-by-country, bilateral FTA approach and appears unwilling to negotiate a 
conditional extension of preferences outside of this framework, even if it were to form 
part of a quid pro quo agreement with the Bolivian government. There have been limited 
indications that the new Democratic leadership in the U.S. Congress may seek to renew 
ATPDEA across the board. The chances of such a proposal to secure widespread 
legislative support, however, are uncertain. For its part, the Morales administration has 
firmly stated its opposition to the type of FTA that Washington might be willing to offer. 
Other potential points of leverage are even more ill suited to securing U.S. 
interests. Continuing to withhold U.S. military aid will not help ensure that the Bolivian 
military remains an independent body that does not turn further to other powers, such as 
China, for assistance. Nor would threatening to cut off counternarcotics funding assist 
U.S. efforts to stem narcotrafficking in the region. Because Bolivia is so heavily 
dependent on foreign assistance, reducing U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and other development funding may very well send a message to the 
government, but it may also intensify the poor social and economic conditions that 
infuriate MAS’s core constituency. Moreover, the Morales administration may believe 
that any shortfalls in U.S. aid could be countered with increased assistance from 
Venezuela and Cuba. In short, the main tools that the Untied States traditionally uses as 
leverage are not viewed by the Bolivian government as powerful, while widespread anti-
Americanism in Bolivia makes it difficult for Washington to be seen as a trustworthy 
third party. 
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With limited instruments to shape Bolivian decision-making on its own, the 
United States must aggressively pursue talks with those allies that also possess a direct 
stake in the current crisis: Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. Continued flexibility on 
counternarcotics issues, sustained U.S. military, development, and democracy assistance, 
and a continued willingness to moderate the tone of U.S. diplomacy will help create an 
environment in which regional diplomacy can succeed.  
At the same time, the United States can take bilateral steps that in the long run 
position Washington to act as a more credible regional player. Demonstrating a 
willingness to adjust dominant models of bilateral FTAs and working closely with 
international institutions to more aggressively tackle development and public health 
issues in Bolivia will not only support a tone of collaboration but also prevent La Paz 
from turning exclusively to Caracas and Havana for international support, an eventuality 
that would undoubtedly feed the Bolivian opposition’s anger and decrease the likelihood 
of compromise. 
Of course, U.S. commitments are not open-ended. If negotiation fails—either 
because of intransigence within Bolivia or because major stakeholders outside of the 
country fail to pursue a joint approach to conflict prevention—the United States can 
consider revoking aid, particularly if the MAS-led government violates human rights, 
dramatically limits civil freedoms, or dismantles an effective system of checks and 
balances within the government. For the moment, however, regional diplomacy is the 
best hope for preventing a deepening of Bolivia’s crisis, and the United States should 
subordinate its own particular interests to that greater goal. Making threats to the Bolivian 
government about hypothetical punitive actions would at this early stage only antagonize 
the MAS’s nationalistic base and decrease the potential for civil peace. 
 
WORK WITH BOLIVIA’S NEIGHBORS 
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina are significant U.S. allies in South America with vested 
stakes in a socially and politically stable and productive Bolivia. Each of these countries 
possesses large energy and trade interests in the country, and each is also likely to be 
affected by a Bolivian out-migration in the event of a crisis.  
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Unfortunately, despite these shared concerns, thus far Brazil, Chile, and Argentina 
have focused primarily on securing their own national commercial and diplomatic 
interests rather than engaging in a serious dialogue with one another about what could 
collectively be done to avert violent conflict in Bolivia. Since the nationalization of the 
hydrocarbons industry, Brazil’s discussions with Bolivia have been dominated by the 
controversy over the takeover of Petrobras and the stalled negotiations over the export 
price of Bolivian gas. Home to almost one million Bolivian migrants who remit millions 
of dollars to their families each year, Argentina has perhaps the most to fear from an 
exodus prompted by crisis. Yet officials in Buenos Aires have focused mostly on 
securing contracts for the importation of badly needed Bolivian natural gas. Chile has 
argued that the long-term solution to an unstable Bolivia lies in greater communication 
and integration. With this in mind, the Chilean government is working with landlocked 
Bolivia through a joint committee for discussion on bilateral ties. Indeed, Chile has made 
important contributions to regional stability by reestablishing full diplomatic relations 
and appearing disposed to negotiate a resolution of the sea access issue that has long 
divided the countries. Nonetheless, there appears to be little coordinated or open dialogue 
among Bolivia’s immediate neighbors about looming social unrest in the country and its 
consequences for the region. 
The United States can take the lead in trying to convince all three states to 
develop concerted strategies for conflict prevention in Bolivia in the short and long term. 
All three countries are currently governed by market-oriented, left-of-center 
governments. Excluding Chile, with which tensions over the sea access issue still linger, 
this orientation gives them the legitimacy needed to be seen as credible intermediaries by 
both the MAS and the organized opposition in the event that Bolivian actors seek external 
arbitration. Although there are no indications that any faction in Bolivia currently wants 
to pursue formal mediation, such a safety net should exist.  
Steps to put in place such a mechanism can be undertaken now. Chile, Brazil, and 
Argentina are best positioned to open channels of communication among the MAS, 
regional governors, and opposition parties in an effort to convince all sides that 
continuing unrest threatens the health of Bolivian democracy, foreign investment, the 
country’s overall economic well-being, and the likelihood that the Bolivian government 
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will be perceived as a reliable partner in international trade and political forums. The 
United States should emphasize to all three governments the severity of the issues at 
stake and the need for contingency planning. While the Bolivian government may yet 
broker a solution that respects the dissenting voices of the opposition, the existence of a 
frank working discussion could in and of itself help persuade Bolivian factions to 
compromise on contentious issues. 
 
• The United States should discuss contingency plans with Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile bilaterally and as a group for addressing hypothetical situations of violence 
in Bolivia, potentially over land redistribution, the Constituent Assembly, or labor 
disputes. Issues for discussion include refugee flows, disrupted energy supplies, 
humanitarian assistance, and conflict mediation. 
• Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States should construct working relations 
and strong lines of communication with the Morales administration, opposition 
parties, and provincial leaders in an effort to convince all sides that compromise is 
vital for Bolivia’s future. 
• The same group of states should formulate a collective approach for encouraging 
equitable social and economic development in Bolivia—the best hope for long-
term conflict prevention and stability.  
 
MOVE AWAY FROM A COLD WAR FRAMEWORK 
In the meantime, the United States should do all that it can to avoid antagonizing the 
MAS-controlled government and jeopardizing its willingness to compromise or 
participate in regional diplomacy. Nearly fifty years after the Cuban Revolution and eight 
years after Hugo Chávez came to power, the United States still appears to believe that 
ideological confrontation and punitive measures can help change political conditions in 
Cuba and Venezuela. Now that Bolivia appears to have joined the anti-U.S. bloc, the 
most serious mistake that the United States could make would be to measure this poor 
Andean republic with the same rod. Excluding Bolivia from key U.S. benefits such as 
trade, military training, development assistance, and counterdrug efforts is more likely to 
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push the government closer to Cuba and Venezuela and increase the likelihood of 
widespread sociopolitical turmoil in Bolivia. Conversely, de-linking U.S. policy toward 
Bolivia from Morales’s relationships with Cuba and Venezuela can do more in the long 
run to achieve political stability. Thankfully, leading U.S. diplomats appear to have 
recognized this fact and are pursuing a pragmatic approach. 
If the United States maintains a cooperative tone, then, ideally, the Bolivian 
government should reciprocate by assuming a less publicly hostile posture toward the 
United States. The Bolivian government should recognize that whatever the domestic 
political gains of incendiary anti-U.S. rhetoric, such rhetoric will make Bolivia’s agenda 
with Washington—including maintaining critical trade benefits and development 
assistance—much harder. If, as it claims, the Morales administration is serious about 
maintaining strong relations with a variety of countries, including the United States, 
toning down its anti-American rhetoric will help clear a path toward programs of mutual 
interest with the United States.  
Such an approach does not amount to unconditional support for the Morales 
administration. If the Morales administration does not reciprocate with a more 
cooperative tone, particularly given his domestic political constraints, U.S. long-term 
energy, security, and counternarcotics interests in Bolivia should not be held hostage to 
the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Morales government. But in the short term, the United 
States should resist the temptation to impose sanctions in order to give regional 
diplomacy a chance to succeed. 
 
• The Bush administration must maintain a diplomatic tone that minimizes the 
ideological differences between the Morales administration and Washington, DC, 
and focuses on trade, economic stability, development and poverty alleviation, 
human rights, and combating corruption and narcotrafficking. Failing to do so 
would likely provoke a defensive reaction on the part of the Morales government, 
one that would inhibit its willingness to discuss compromise solutions with 
regional partners. 
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• The U.S. government should clearly communicate to Morales that it will continue 
to work with Bolivia bilaterally and through multilateral channels independent of 
U.S. relations with Cuba and Venezuela.  
• The U.S. government should reassure the Morales administration that it strongly 
supports Bolivian democracy, the pro-change agenda MAS has embarked upon, 
and that, following accepted hemispheric principles, the United States rejects any 
kind of unconstitutional or violent strategy of political confrontation by or against 
elected officials.  
• At the same time, the United States should make absolutely clear to the Bolivian 
opposition that any attempts to force unconstitutional or violent change will also 
be opposed by the United States. 
 
MOVE AWAY FROM THE CENTRALITY OF THE DRUG WAR 
As noted, U.S. counterdrug efforts provided Morales, the MAS, and their followers with 
the ammunition to lead an anti-U.S. crusade in Bolivia. The important issue at this stage 
is that Bolivian cocaine is not reaching the United States. Counternarcotics practices in 
other parts of the Andes are apparently preventing the flow of the drug north, making 
Bolivian cocaine an Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Paraguayan, Uruguayan, and 
European problem. Despite the shift in cocaine trafficking toward Bolivia’s neighbors, 
those countries appear to be less concerned about the issue than the United States and are 
instead seeking ways to expand the breadth of their relations with Bolivia.  
This does not mean that the United States should withdraw from the 
counternarcotics arena entirely. Implementing Morales’s community-based coca 
eradication objectives requires much more thought and trial and error; it would be 
premature to condemn his approach so soon and simply denounce Bolivian counterdrug 
efforts. Thus far, the United States has prudently recognized this fact. The DEA retains a 
strong presence in the country and continues to work closely with Bolivian authorities on 
cocaine interdiction. This flexibility has helped decrease tensions between Washington 
and La Paz that would otherwise distract from immediate efforts to forge domestic 
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political compromise and involve Bolivia’s neighbors in an open dialogue about the 
country’s future. 
 
• The United States should continue collaborating with the Morales 
administration’s experiments with community-based drug eradication.  
• The United States should work with Bolivian authorities to define, refine, and 
measure the success of community-based eradication efforts and then clearly and 
jointly define the penalties to be enacted if Bolivia’s self-established eradication 
goals are not met. These penalties could include reductions in economic 
assistance and the elimination of trade preferences, but these measures would only 
reinforce the desirability of coca production. 
• The U.S. government should prepare its response to the results of the legal coca 
consumption report commissioned by Morales to determine the level of demand 
for traditional use of the leaf. The results of the study will be controversial and are 
likely to support the government’s thesis that the demand for legal coca has 
increased. In this eventuality, the U.S. government should avoid an angry reaction 
and work as closely as possible with Bolivian officials to provide the economic 
opportunities that will foster voluntary eradication.  
• As CPA’s Andes 2020 commission report recommended in 2004, the United 
States should use this moment to shift away from the strictly military and police 
dimensions of counterdrug efforts toward social and economic strategies with 
expanded alternative development programs. A significant amount of nondrug-
related industry has been created in the Chapare and other areas that can benefit 
from U.S. assistance. 
 
MAINTAIN AND DEEPEN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
U.S. policy toward Bolivia must be built on the premise that support for pluralist 
democratic institutions and leaders is a long-term proposition. To strengthen the quality 
of democracy in Bolivia, the United States, through the USAID, should continue its 
support for democratic institutions in Bolivia, including the legislature, the electoral 
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system, the judiciary, political parties, and civil society groups. Within either its 
democracy or the integrated development pillar, USAID needs to allocate more funds for 
professional training programs, particularly for indigenous peoples. At the same time, the 
United States should closely monitor the work of USAID, its grantees, and U.S.-backed 
democracy promotion organizations so that U.S. democracy assistance does not become a 
means for solely strengthening the opposition or influencing short-term electoral results. 
This will inevitably lead to comparisons with the controversial U.S. approach in 
Venezuela. Continued assistance on these fronts is vital as Bolivia’s democracy confronts 
serious divisions and institutional conflicts with the potential to expand into generalized 
violence. Though these programs in and of themselves will probably not prevent a 
conflict from spreading, they represent an important symbolic commitment to the 
preservation of democratic ideals in Bolivia.  
 
• The U.S. government should focus its bilateral assistance, channeled through 
USAID, the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the Department 
of State, and government-funded democracy promotion organizations, on 
supporting civil society organizations and their commitment to conflict resolution. 
• USAID should allocate funds to provide more educational and training 
opportunities for Bolivia’s future leaders, especially for indigenous populations 
that comprise more than 60 percent of the population.  
 
RENEW BILATERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
The transformation of the coup-prone Bolivian military into an institution that respects 
civilian authority is in no small part a result of the U.S. Southern Command’s work with 
the Bolivian armed forces. The United States has been the principal foreign source of 
military assistance to Bolivia since 1985, in part through International Military Education 
Training (IMET) programs. IMET provides professional military education to key 
Bolivian military personnel, principally through attendance at U.S. military command 
and staff colleges, focusing on civil-military relations, resource management, and 
democratic institution building.  
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But the Bush administration altered the conditions for this partnership with the 
2002 American Service Members Protection Act, which prohibits U.S. military assistance 
to countries that have not signed “Article 98” agreements, bilateral pacts wherein 
countries pledge not to seek the prosecution of U.S. citizens in the International Criminal 
Court. Without such an agreement, U.S. military personnel and other citizens could be 
tried at the court for severe human rights violations. By April 2006, the United States had 
cut down foreign military assistance and IMET programs to twelve Latin American 
countries, including Bolivia, to punish their refusals to sign Article 98 agreements. 
In October 2006, however, President Bush issued a partial waiver of the law, 
freeing up IMET aid to eleven of the Latin American countries that had seen their aid 
frozen. (Only Venezuela was unaffected by the waiver.) Although it is not likely to ratify 
an Article 98 agreement, the United States should continue to waive the law and revive 
military assistance in order to support Bolivia in developing and strengthening 
democratic civilian rule of its armed forces. A professional, highly trained military can 
provide an important moderating effect in a country prone to civil conflict. 
 
• The United States needs to continue military-to-military relations with Bolivia, 
particularly through IMET and other programs that emphasize civil-military 
relations and resource management.  
• The United States should oppose any and all coups under all circumstances.  
 
EXPAND AND PUBLICIZE SOCIAL PROGRAMMING  
In the long run, U.S. officials can do much more to ensure that the United States is seen 
as a trustworthy, committed, and well-intentioned partner in Bolivia’s quest for 
sustainable development. USAID is the largest bilateral donor in Bolivia, and the fourth 
largest overall donor, after the Andean Community Fund, the World Bank, and the 
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IADB, all of which provide concessionary loans as opposed to grants. USAID spent 
about $95 million in fiscal year 2004 and $85 million in fiscal years 2005 and 2006.15  
Despite these sizable U.S. resources dedicated to popular participation, economic 
opportunity, natural resource management, health, education, and food security programs 
in Bolivia, few Bolivian citizens realize that these efforts even exist. Laudable programs 
implemented through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sometimes receive 
extensive praise without ever giving credit to the USAID for funding them. With fewer 
resources, Cuba and Venezuela are achieving enormous public relations benefits from 
their literacy campaigns and health assistance. The United States must do a better job of 
publicizing its significant social programming in Bolivia. Grass-roots efforts that foster 
face-to-face interaction and trust building are preferable to public relations campaigns, 
which may alienate NGO partners. 
 
• USAID should continue its work to expand the public profile of its programs in 
Bolivia that aim to improve basic living conditions among the country’s poorest 
sectors, where the MAS has won its greatest support. This might be achieved by 
interacting with religious, diplomatic, and community leaders in Bolivia, and 
expanding the recently begun branding and marketing initiative at the USAID 
mission in La Paz.  
 
PROMOTE TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
The Bolivian government’s decision to pursue the still nascent ALBA and TCP with 
Cuba and Venezuela, to assume the pro tempore presidency of the Andean Community 
with the intention of asking Colombia and Peru to abandon their free trade agreements 
with the United States, and to reject the possibility of a FTA with the United States leaves 
Washington with restricted policy options regarding trade.  
Lawmakers who have historically been active in U.S.-Latin America policy areas 
and who have significant influence in the U.S. Congress may be offended by Bolivia’s 
                                                 
15 USAID, Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2007: Bolivia, http://www.usaid.gov/ 
policy/budget/cbj2007/lac/. 
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friendship with Cuba and Venezuela. Moreover, the anti-U.S. tone of the ALBA and TCP 
makes it even more difficult to build support for Bolivia among U.S. policymakers.  
Yet, the United States should not overreact to Bolivia’s agreements with Cuba 
and Venezuela. The Bolivian government may soon realize that $100 million in credit 
and $30 million in gifts from the Venezuelan government will not be enough to replace 
the over $350 million per year that the U.S. market represents to the Bolivian economy. 
Cuban scholarships and medical assistance will also mean little in the medium term if the 
Bolivian economy begins to take a downturn in the absence of significant foreign 
investment. While negotiating a mutually agreeable FTA with Bolivia may not be 
feasible in the near future, the United States can indicate its willingness to do so in the 
medium term and, at a minimum, listen to the conditions under which the government of 
Bolivia would consider undertaking FTA talks over time. 
 
• The United States should discuss with La Paz some type of compensation for the 
loss of the Colombian soybean market that will result from the U.S.-Colombia 
FTA. 
• The United States should provide trade adjustment assistance for Bolivia and 
other Latin American states as part of bilateral trade agreements under negotiation 
with Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, especially for labor-intensive sectors such as 
agriculture, where displacement is particularly destabilizing and can contribute to 
greater anti-U.S. sentiment in the Andean region. 
• If serious conflict persists in Bolivia beyond the current six-month extension of 
ATPDEA, the United States should consider re-extending the legislation. 
Abruptly ending preferences may provoke economic difficulties that aggravate 
social tensions. 
 
WORK WITH EUROPEAN DONORS AND MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Closely coordinated efforts by the United States, European donors, and multilateral 
agencies are needed to address some of the shortcomings of the neoliberal model’s focus 
on macroeconomic stability. While the United States has taken a cautious approach to the 
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Morales administration, representatives of European donor states and multilateral 
organizations have begun working with the new government in tackling its enormous 
challenges. In fact, a World Bank official interviewed for this project claimed that his 
organization’s relations with the Morales government are far better than with any recent 
previous government, despite Morales’s repeated anti-World Bank rhetoric. In a 
surprisingly generous move, in 2006 the World Bank canceled $1.53 billion of Bolivia’s 
external debt, while the International Monetary Fund canceled $232.5 million. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) also play a role in Bolivia. Units of the OAS are helping organize 
the Constituent Assembly and will again monitor the electoral process. UNDP is working 
to address Bolivia’s public health and equitable development challenges. 
 
• United States should work closely with European donors, UNDP, World Bank, 
and the Andean Development Corporation to coordinate donor programs in areas, 
such as rural development, public health, and democratic institution building, that 
are compatible with USAID programs and goals. 
• The United States and its allies must guarantee adequate funding for the OAS 
units charged with implementing electoral monitoring and other mandates if the 
OAS is to play a critical role in Bolivia and the hemisphere. 
 
PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCEDE TO THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT  
During the brief presidency of Eduardo Rodríguez, Bolivia prepared an impressive MCA 
proposal. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice left open the possibility of MCA funding 
for Bolivia during her meeting with Morales in Santiago, Chile, at the inauguration of 
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet in March 2004. The $598 million for which Bolivia 
is eligible could have an almost immediate effect on rural development and on the way 
Bolivia’s poor perceive the United States.  
The MCA is meant to reward those countries that have demonstrated real policy 
change. Given the record of the last nine months, where perhaps only in health care and 
education does the government show a positive record—and with Cuban and Venezuelan 
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intervention in Bolivian affairs—it is difficult to make a case for MCA funding for 
Bolivia. To continue to qualify for MCA funds, Bolivia will have to demonstrate that the 
government is fighting corruption, respecting human rights, embracing the rule of law, 
investing in health care and education, following responsible economic policies, and 
enabling entrepreneurship.  
At the same time, because other sources of development assistance are not 
available, and taking into consideration that widespread social unrest has significant 
repercussions for stability in the Andean region, the United States should consider 
granting Bolivia MCA funds in order to establish greater leverage in this now embattled 
country. Such a sizable influx of assistance, if targeted and administered correctly, could 
significantly help temper some of the social tensions that are currently fueling conflict 
and violence. 
 
• The United States should resist the temptation to link drug eradication programs 
to the MCA. Rather, the MCA should be linked explicitly to the continuity of a 
pluralist democracy, defined as a system of government where minority parties 
and organizations are not subjected to unrestricted majority rule. The principal 
example of this dangerous majoritarianism was the Morales government’s attempt 
to reform the constitution by a simple majority vote that technically excludes the 
opposition from having a say in the process.  
• The United States should be seen as wanting to help Bolivia qualify for MCA 
funding and therefore should target technical assistance to Bolivian institutions to 
facilitate the meeting of MCA prerequisites and standards.  
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CONCLUSION 
Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia with a historic mandate to address 
Bolivia’s core dilemmas of social exclusion and poverty by restoring the authority of the 
state in economic decision-making, challenging the country’s traditional political class, 
and empowering the nation’s poor. Yet his promise of justice contains the threat of 
instability. 
Sadly, in the name of ending the exclusion of indigenous sectors, the Bolivian 
government may take steps that exclude social or political actors identified with the 
traditional party system or other opposition. Underlying tensions surrounding the 
realignment of racial and ethnic relations are dangerously drifting toward ever-
moreviolent confrontations between pro-government forces and those—the political 
opposition, business leaders, and regional governors—that are attempting to stay in the 
political game.  
As long as the crisis persists, the United States will find it difficult to make 
progress on its traditional policy agenda in Bolivia. Indeed, should any of these tensions 
reach a boiling point, sparking widespread social unrest or violence, U.S. interests in 
Bolivia and in the Andean rim subregion may be threatened. But at the same time, the 
tools once wielded by the United States as levers to influence Bolivian political actors, 
namely, trade, counternarcotics and military assistance, and development aid, do not 
seem sufficient to compel an accommodation between Morales and the political 
opposition. For that reason, working with Bolivia’s neighbors to develop a coordinated 
approach for preventing widespread violent unrest is the best way to secure U.S. interests 
in Bolivia. 
In the short run, the priority for U.S. policy toward Bolivia must be conflict 
prevention. The United States should encourage an active dialogue among critical 
regional actors that may be in a better position to foster dialogue among Bolivia’s 
dissenting factions and garner commitment by all parties involved to exercise good faith 
in a process of constitutional reform demanded by the majority of the electorate. Regional 
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diplomacy will only succeed, however, if Washington demonstrates continued flexibility 
on counternarcotics and trade issues. 
Such a strategy does not amount to unqualified support for the Morales 
government. Rather, this approach appropriately takes into account the fact that in this 
particularly problematic social context, actively attempting to isolate Bolivia, weaken 
Morales, or set conditions for continued U.S. assistance could create a vacuum of 
influence that will be filled mainly by Cuba and Venezuela and could significantly 
increase the likelihood that widespread social unrest will erupt. 
In the long run, the United States faces a unique opportunity to help facilitate 
significant social change in Bolivia as it did, in some measure, during the country’s first 
major social revolution in the 1950s. Despite some of the Morales government’s 
controversial policy decisions, verbal assaults against U.S. leadership, and its relationship 
with Cuba and Venezuela, U.S. efforts should continue to promote the strengthening of 
democratic institutions and the construction of a polity where minority political and 
social actors maintain a voice in the political system. Furthermore, the United States must 
work with the Morales administration, in conjunction with Bolivia’s neighbors, European 
donors, and multilateral institutions, to create the conditions for long-term sustainable 
growth and stability. 
 47
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Eduardo A. Gamarra is the director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center, a 
professor of political science, and editor of Hemisphere, a magazine on Latin American 
and Caribbean affairs, at Florida International University. Gamarra is the author of over 
one hundred articles on Latin America and is the author, coauthor, and editor of twelve 
books, including Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia 1964–1985; three volumes of the 
Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record; Latin American Political Economy 
in the Age of Neoliberal Reform; Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin 
America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; and Entre la Droga y la 
Democracia.  
 48 
 
MISSION STATEMENT OF THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION 
The Center for Preventive Action seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly 
conflicts around the world and to expand the body of knowledge on conflict prevention. 
It does so by creating a forum in which representatives of governments, international 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and civil society can gather 
to develop operational and timely strategies for promoting peace in specific conflict 
situations. The center focuses on conflicts in countries or regions that affect U.S. 
interests, but may be otherwise overlooked; where prevention appears possible; and when 
the resources of the Council on Foreign Relations can make a difference. The center does 
this by: 
 
• Convening Independent Preventive Action Commissions composed of Council 
members, staff, and other experts. The commissions devise a practical, actionable 
conflict-prevention strategy tailored to the facts of the particular conflict. 
• Issuing Council Special Reports to evaluate and respond rapidly to developing 
conflict situations and formulate timely, concrete policy recommendations that the 
U.S. government, international community, and local actors can use to limit the 
potential for deadly violence.  
• Engaging the U.S. government and news media in conflict prevention efforts. The 
center’s staff and commission members meet with administration officials and 
members of Congress to brief on CPA’s findings and recommendations; facilitate 
contacts between U.S. officials and critical local and external actors; and raise 
awareness among journalists of potential flashpoints around the globe. 
• Building networks with international organizations and institutions to complement 
and leverage the Council’s established influence in the U.S. policy arena and increase 
the impact of CPA’s recommendations.  
• Providing a source of expertise on conflict prevention to include research, case 
studies, and lessons learned from past conflicts that policymakers and private citizens 
can use to prevent or mitigate future deadly conflicts.  
49 
CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
John W. Vessey Jr., USA  
GENERAL, USA (RET.); 
CHAIR, CPA ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
 
Morton I. Abramowitz 
THE CENTURY FOUNDATION 
 
Peter Ackerman 
ROCKPORT CAPITAL INC. 
 
Patrick M. Byrne 
OVERSTOCK.COM 
 
Antonia Handler Chayes 
TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
 
Leslie H. Gelb 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
Joachim Gfoeller Jr. 
GMG CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLP 
 
Richard N. Haass 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
David A. Hamburg 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY MEDICAL 
COLLEGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John G. Heimann 
FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE 
 
George A. Joulwan 
GENERAL, USA (RET.); 
ONE TEAM, INC. 
 
Jane Holl Lute 
UNITED NATIONS  
 
Vincent A. Mai 
AEA INVESTORS INC. 
 
Margaret Farris Mudd 
FINANCIAL SERVICES VOLUNTEER CORPS 
 
Kenneth Roth 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
 
Barnett R. Rubin 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
 
Julia Vadala Taft 
 
Robert G. Wilmers 
MANUFACTURERS & TRADERS TRUST CO. 
 
James D. Zirin 
SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP 
51 
RECENT COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORTS 
SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq 
Steven N. Simon; CSR No. 23, February 2007 
 
Darfur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities 
Lee Feinstein; CSR No. 22, January 2007 
 
Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Terrence Lyons; CSR No. 21, December 2006 
A Center for Preventive Action Report 
 
Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela 
Richard Lapper; CSR No. 20, November 2006 
A Center for Preventive Action Report 
 
Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right 
Keith E. Maskus; CSR No. 19, November 2006 
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report  
 
Foreign Investment and National Security: Getting the Balance Right 
Alan P. Larson, David M. Marchick; CSR No. 18, July 2006 
A Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies Report 
 
Challenges for a Postelection Mexico: Issues for U.S. Policy 
Pamela K. Starr; CSR No. 17, June 2006 (web-only release) and November 2006 
 
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward 
Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson; CSR No. 16, June 2006 
 
Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations 
Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall; CSR No. 15, June 2006 
 
Peace in Papua: Widening a Window of Opportunity 
Blair A. King; CSR No. 14, March 2006 
A Center for Preventive Action Report 
 
Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security 
Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto; CSR No. 13, March 2006 
 
Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy 
Barnett R. Rubin; CSR No. 12, March 2006 
 
Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism 
Charles D. Ferguson; CSR No. 11, March 2006 
 
To purchase a printed copy, call the Brookings Institution Press: 800-537-5487. 
Note: Council Special Reports are available to download from the Council’s website, CFR.org. 
For more information, contact publications@cfr.org. 
